



ORIGINAL PAPER

Institutionalisation of Newcomer Parties in Theory and Practice: the Case Study of ANO 2011

Olga Brunnerová*

Abstract

An increasing popularity of new political subject has been noticeable across Europe in recent years. Yet, many of these subjects have only been able to sustain themselves for a limited time. The aim of this paper is to investigate the process of institutionalisation of political parties, through which they become stable and consolidated elites. The aim is to present a modified concept of institutionalisation, based on the work of David Arter and EinaKestilä-Kakkonen (2014). On three separate levels, this concept explores the electoral, internal and legislative dimensions of institutionalisation. Quantitative indicators that are useful when comparing a larger amount of cases are also provided. This approach is then tested in practice and applied to the party ANO 2011, which became a major political force in the Czech Republic.

Keywords: *political parties; institutionalization; the Czech Republic; ANO 2011; newcomer parties.*

*PhD candidate, Mgr., Metropolitan university Prague; Phone: 00420737314553; Email: olga.brunnerova@gmail.com.

Political parties form an integral part of the party system and are crucial for a well-functioning democracy. Stable and predictable parties generate clear expectations about their political actors, their behaviour, overall structure and rules of party competition. They carry out fundamental representative functions more effectively and have less motivation to violate democratic conventions and principles (Tavits, 2013: 1; Randall, Svåsand, 2002:6; Meleschevich, 2007: 16; McMenamin, Gwiazda, 2011:838). Although success in elections is beneficial for political parties since it paves the way to new resources and power, it is still only a short-term success. New parties are less consolidated, and when exposed to functional pressures can very easily be destabilized. Success in the next elections shows that the individual party has managed to cope with the first critical period, or that the new obligations and pressures arising from parliamentary actions did not have an immediate disintegration effect (see Bolleyer, Bytzek, 2013). However, it is possible to observe tendencies to neglect the issue of the institutionalisation – “*the process by which organisations acquire value and stability*” (Huntington, 1986: 12) – of political parties as such (More frequently research connects the exploration of political party institutionalisation and the party system institutionalization, without making a clear distinction between these two processes (see Randal, Svåsand, 2006: 8; Randall, 2006: 9; Sandbrook, 1996; Markowski, 2001: 56; Randall, 2006: 2).

The aim of this paper is to look into the process of the institutionalization of political parties. An approach that is suitable for the research of newcomer party institutionalization in the newly established democracies of the post-communistic region of Central and Eastern Europe is discussed, before testing this concept on a practical example. Next, a framework modified to suit the analysis of newcomer parties in the post-communist region is presented. This framework is then applied to ANO 2011, which though the course of the past two parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic became a major political force. However, institutionalization of this party and thus its future is far from certain.

There is a wide range of meanings and concepts of institutionalisation. From focusing on formal sets of rules, to the inclusion of various aspects of culture and with very diverse sets of phenomena which institutionalisation is combined with (see Levitsky, 1998: 79). The original concept of institutionalisation originated in sociology, specifically from approaches based on structural functionalism (Strauber, 2015: 135), and was previously used in political research in connection with political organisations. Samuel Huntington (1986), generally considered the ‘originator’ of institutionalisation focused research of political parties, proposed to measure the degree of institutionalisation on the basis of four dimensions: *adaptability*, *organisational complexity*, *autonomy* and *coherence*. Many experts followed Huntington’s approach to institutionalisation and operationalised it. There have been numerous studies into the theoretical background of the research of institutionalisation (see Panebianco, 1988; Levitsky, 1998; Harmel, Svåsand, 1993; Randall, Svåsand, 2002; Basedau, Stroh, 2008 or CasalBértoa, 2016). The difficulty with employing most of the concepts used in the research of institutionalisation and complicating the possibilities of subsequent reproduction of their research is twofold. First, as with the concept of Randall and Svåsand (2002), the operationalisation of the individual indicators is not sufficient and thus the individual indicators that are used to access the individual dimensions are left to possible interpretation. Second, as with the concept of Basedau and Stroh (2008), the

Institutionalisation of Newcomer Parties in Theory and Practice...

criteria are often clearly designed to explore the institutionalisation in developing countries, their operationalisation and use as testable indicators in a different environment is complicated.

Examination of institutionalization in the context of Central Europe

In Central Europe, during the past decades, numerous newcomer parties have been able to secure seats in Parliament – few of them however managed to secure a permanent place in the party system¹. When exploring the institutionalization in the post-communist region it is important to take several specific characteristics of these newly formed democracies into consideration. Most importantly, often party systems are not yet fully established. Electorates are volatile, often changing the fragmentation of the systems which complicates government formation. Even if these democracies appear stable and formed at some point, they often underwent a noticeable change in recent elections. The process of institutionalization thus cannot be perceived as a finite one. De-institutionalization may occur due to a loss of electoral support, as a result of political affairs, personnel changes, political failures or disintegration of formal structures (see Harmel, Svåsand, Mjelde, 2016). Moreover, the institutionalisation does not necessarily happen simultaneously on all levels of party development. Whereas the party can be strongly institutionalised in some aspects, successful institutionalisation may be prevented by inadequate institutionalisation in others.

The most suitable foundation for this line of research appears to be the approach of Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen (2014). The authors assume that an institutionalised party needs to have a stable electoral base or permanent supporters, an organisational structure, a member core, a sufficient supply of candidates and a dispersion of roles and authority. Its representatives act as a coherent legislative party who, if needed, will support the government of their party. The fundamental advantage of this theoretical point is that the authors do not expect parties to achieve some state of “perfect institutionalization” in all dimensions simultaneously, thus depicting the asynchronous nature of the institutionalization process (see Arter, Kestilä-Kakkonen, 2014).

The following analysis shows how the institutionalisation in the new post communist democracies can be researched on three separate levels, showing that the process can be strong in one aspect of institutionalisation, but weak in another. Based on Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen’s approach (2014) the division into the electoral, internal and legislative institutionalization dimensions is being preserved. This bears witness to the turbulent and volatile party development in Central Europe. The aim of this paper is to refine the concept of Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen whose research was tailored to suit one specific party, and introduce operationalized subcategories which would then be transferable to different parties and countries, providing a tool for cross-party analysis. More quantitative indicators are employed for these reasons as well. The approach is then applied to the case of the Czech political party ANO 2011, showing its application in practice and testing if the concept of Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen’s research can be

¹ Many of these parties defined themselves as “non-traditional”, forming an imaginary counterpart to the established elites. For instance, in Poland the Palikot’s Movement in 2011 or Kukiz ’15 and Nowoczesna movements in the 2015 elections were successful, as well as the Alliance of the New Citizen in 2012, the OL’ano in 2002 and #SIEŤ in 2016 in Slovakia, or the Public Affairs in 2010 or ANO and The Dawn of Direct Democracy in 2013 in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, parties such as Jobbik or Politics Can Be Different were elected to the parliamentary body both in 2010 and 2014.

modified in such a way to suit the needs of the research of institutionalisation in other countries. The institutionalisation process will be tested on:

Electoral level of Party Institutionalisation

This level of analysis is based on the *social rootedness* dimension and also partially reflects the aspect of *value infusion*. An institutionalized party will have a relatively stable electorate base and a recognizable core of supporters; a volatile electorate and weak party identification suggests a low level of electoral party institutionalization.

Level and homogeneity of electoral gains – a party can be considered more institutionalized if it represents a valid political alternative for an increasing number of voters that is evenly distributed over the territory. As indicators, the electoral gains of past elections, surveys of electorate's preferences and party nationalizations scores expressing the heterogeneity of territorial distribution of electoral support can be used.

Existence of characteristic electoral core – if the party is “rooted” in a certain social circle, it is easier to find a specific strategy for its electoral campaign and to adapt the overall image of the party to attract as many voters from the desired electorate group.

Voters' identification with the party – while the charisma of a leader of few elites is capable of attracting voters in the short term, the more institutionalized are those parties the voters of which identify themselves primarily with the party (and its programme) as a whole.

Affiliated organizations and spreading of values – parties that have their own think-tanks, educational programmes, community organization or specific, or host social and cultural events, as well as own party press etc. can use these platforms to make others more aware of the values they hold and better shape the identity of their party in voters' minds.

Internal level of party institutionalisation

Although a party leader or a group of founders can rely purely on their charisma and avoid the primary need to build a strong party organization, the stronger the internal party institutionalization, the greater the prospect of the party's survival beyond its original founders. An institutionalized party should have *systemness*—a clearly defined internal structure and developed organizational procedures, respected both by the party elite and by the regular members. Simultaneously, the party should not be dependent on an external actor, thus possessing *decisional autonomy*.

Membership base – a stable membership base which grows without significant fluctuations indicates a higher degree of institutionalization. It suggests a sufficient party socialization and establishment of inner party culture.²A supportive indicator in this category may be the number of local and regional organization, as well as the member to voter ratio.

Candidate base – parties are perceived as more institutionalized if they are able to nominate candidates on an adequate scale to all types of elections without any problems. A lack of candidates or controversy in creating ballots can reflect in a negative way the state of the party's organizational base and can seriously jeopardize the party's election results.

² However, it is necessary to reflect that some of the parties may have a minimum membership core, but a broad base of “registered supporters”.

Institutionalisation of Newcomer Parties in Theory and Practice...

Distribution and regulation of power – increased institutionalization takes place if the rules governing the organizational structure, the distribution of power and the appointment of party positions function in the party. The frequent exchanges of senior management or the lack of rank member ability to influence party leadership has a negative effect on institutionalization.

Diversification and independence of resources –Diversification of income strengthens the party's decisional autonomy and allows it to endure changes in the income (for which the Gini coefficient may be a useful tool). If the party is dependent on the financial support of an external actor, it could be forced to adjust its own objectives in line with the will of its sponsor, whereas the ideals and policies becomes secondary to keeping the party alive.

Legislative level party institutionalization

The creation of a trusted body of elected representatives at local or parliamentary level and functional party clubs points toward the party's *cohesion*. A reliable club enables the party to enforce policies and laws and to be perceived as a stable and predictable player. If representatives of the party are volatile, or frequent objects of political affairs, the public as well as other political actors can intentionally or unintentionally change their perception of this party, modifying their aspirations and expectations toward it.

Political defection – defection of party members can indicate dissatisfaction with the party line, particularly in parties with a strong leader. In some cases, parties try to cope with a low level of cohesion by setting up barriers against defection (e.g. in the form of forced signatures of contracts subjecting representatives to fines), which needs to be properly reflected.

Party splitting – party factionalism can have devastating effects on the club's legislative work and damage the party's reputation. Such a split is undesirable in terms of institutionalisation, since it complicates the work of the representatives' club, and it is negatively perceived by the public. However, the tolerance of different opinion groups within the party and its clubs is appropriate and strengthens the institutionalization process, unless factions within the party endanger the legislative cohesion of the club.

Non-conformist behaviour – if it is possible to document a non-conformist behaviour of individuals towards the parent party that led to warnings, disciplinary actions or exclusions from the club, the reputation caused by these affairs can damage the party's institutionalization process.

The institutionalisation of a business-firm party: the case of ANO 2011


On 11 May 2012, the ANO 2011 movement was registered with the Czech Ministry of Interior. Its foundation is linked to the previous initiative of its founder, Andrej Babiš, called *Akcespokojenýchobčanů* (the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), which criticized the state of the Czech society and the level of corruption. From a political newcomer, Babiš quickly established a major force, reinforcing his power through the subsequent elections on both local and national level. However, after only 7 years in politics and after his second major success in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, Babiš struggles to form a functioning government that can gain the trust of the lower house and rule the country.

The first breakthrough of ANO came in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2013. With 18,65 % of the vote the movement placed second and gained 47


mandates out of a total of 200, only 2 shy of beating the Social Democrats (ČSSD). In 2017 the party dominated the elections, seizing victory in all 14 regions. Notably, the heterogeneity of electoral gains of ANO was very low in both elections to the Chamber of Deputies.

The party has more homogenous support than any other party in the Czech Republic. Only two years later, in the local elections of 2016, the party won in 9 out of 13 regions and got 176 local representatives. However, in the elections in Prague and in the Senate elections the party still struggled, not being able to provide enough strong representatives for person–rather than party-oriented elections.

Figure 1. The results of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, 2010-2018




Source: Volby.cz (2017)



Source: Volby.cz (2017)

Elections 2017




Source: Volby.cz (2017)

It is apparent that ANO is not rooted in any specific segment of society. The party program lacks a unifying ideological framework and reflect diverse requests of the electorate, focuses on the electoral base of the former government coalition in 2013. More than three fifths of its voters came from the Civic Democrats (ODS), the TOP 09 party and the Public Affairs (VV). This attests more to the state of disappointment of the Czech centre-to-right voters than to the ideological profile of ANO. In 2017 most of the ANO's electorate came from the left-wing specter, while more than a third of voters of ČSSD from the previous elections switched to Babiš in 2017, as did a considerable number of new voters and the Communist party (KSČM) electorate. ANO then does not target any specific socioeconomic group. Its voters being spread evenly between age, profession and education groups in 2013 and leaning more towards the 60+ age group, middle to lower education and manual laborers and unemployed/retired categories (for more detail see Gregor, 2014; Beníšková, 2017; Šoulová, 2017). Crucial for the party is the identification of its electorate with the person of its leader. Babiš represents the image of the whole party, accompanying local leaders on billboards for local elections, keeping a dominant position during party negotiations and media events, as well as maintaining strong influence within the party itself.

The main channel for ANO to communicate with the electorate are social media. The party and Babiš himself maintain active Facebook and Twitter pages. The party also recurrently prints election newsletters. Connected to ANO is the youth organisation *Mladé ANO* (Young ANO), established in 2015, and the *IPPS* (Institute for politics and society) a think-tank which was established by Babiš to cultivate Czech political and public space, to nurture new politicians for ANO and to define new strategies and goals in regards to the politics of the Czech Republic (IPPS 2018).

The membership base of ANO is extremely limited and exclusive. There is a six month waiting period for the applicants, as well as extensive set of requirements.³ Members of ANO are strongly monitored, and need to report any proceedings with their persons. The party also has mechanisms to exclude members effectively (for more detail see Charvát and Just, 2016 or Kopeček and Svačinová, 2015). These barriers have been justified by the party as precautions against political tourists and careerists, seeking professional and experienced members only (Válková, 2013). Nevertheless, the membership base of ANO is growing slowly, especially around the time of local elections. The party also has access to a large group of so-called registered supporters, who help to spread the values of the party and root it within society. ANO does have enough motivated members to establish an organisational structure in the region of the Czech Republic, keeping a steadily growing number of local cells as well as a stable number of regional organisations. The candidate base of ANO also shows evidence of strengthening of institutionalisation. Although the party still has issues finding strong and well-known candidates for elections to the Senate and on the municipality levels, in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies the percentage of candidates who are members of ANO grew significantly between 2013 and 2017, where 92 % of all candidates have been affiliated with the party.


Figure 2. Number of party members of selected parties, 2010-2017



Source: Válková, H. (2013); Strauber, J. (2015); Kopeček, L., Svačinová, P. (2015). Charvát, J., Just, P., (2016); Anobudelip.cz. (2018) and author's research

³ Including for example a CV, clear criminal record and debt statements and more.

Figure 3. Nationalisation levels for selected parties, 2010-2017



Source: Volby.cz (2017), calculated according to Golosov (2016)

The distribution and regulation of power within ANO is uneven. Babiš keeps firm control over the party through formal and informal mechanisms. The directive leadership, strong control over the inner workings of the party and the personnel prevents large fluctuation in the party elite and frequent alterations in the top tier party management. But it also prevents the common members from influencing the party affairs. The position of Babiš was strengthened over time. After the 2013 quarrel between Babiš and newly elected party co-chairmen, only trusted members are elected into top party positions, and the party congresses of 2015 and 2017 granted the chairman even more power, making him irreplaceable during political negotiations and able to intervene into the candidate list construction, as well as granting the authority to change, cross off, add or change the order of candidates, even after the lists have been accepted by the party organs (see i.e. Charvát, Just, 2016).


Table 1. Number of ANO's organisations

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Local organisations	0	59	187	236	247	260
Regional organisations	19	91	90	92	97	97

Source: anobudelip.cz (2018)

The party's financing is also problematic due to the lack of diversification. In the first years of the party existence, gifts from Babiš and companies owned by his holding Agrofert represented about 88 % of its income. Although the income has become more heterogeneous in recent years, the party still heavily relies on donations and major portions of its finances are loans, limiting the party's decisional autonomy and financial stability. Another problematic aspect is the number of subsidies from the state and from the EU heading towards companies associated through personal ties and personnel with ANO, which can constitute a substantive conflict of interests in the future.

Figure 4. Heterogeneity of income of selected parties, 2010-2017.
Calculations: Gini coefficient



Source: politickefinance.cz (2018)

Since the leader of ANO has an unusually strong position within the party, and he is surrounded by a group of loyal party elite members, exiting the party is one of the few ways members can express dissatisfaction. The elites then dispose of a strong control when it comes to expelling members from the party or removing them from party offices. A high degree of discipline is apparent in ANO, with only one MP switching parties⁴. (PsP 2018). This discipline is more prominent with elected representatives and the governmental level. On the other hand, on the local and regional level, disputes and rifts between party clubs in town and local governments are more common, leading to the dissolution of local organisations, removal of local elites from offices etc. ANO tries to deal actively with these issues (see Charvát, Just, 2016: 96).

More than party switching, there is a gradual trickle of party members leaving ANO, which is on top of that quite often publicised, with many members mentioning similar reasons for their decision to depart from ANO. These include the non-democratic ways in which the party is organized on the inside and its authoritarian leadership, abandoning original policies and ideals, intrigues, and the majority not being respected etc. All these lead to numerous representatives from the regional levels of the party leaving ANO throughout last couple years.⁵

As its membership base is quite small and with high barriers towards new members and members leaving, when their opinions do not match the ones of the party's

⁴Kristýna Zelenková left ANO in 2016, expressing her discontent with the leadership, changing in the party's policies and inner relationships, later joining the TOP 09 party (Kopecký, 2016).

⁵In the Southern Bohemia region, about 20 members left the party in connection to the way the pre-election campaign was handled in 2016, in the Olomouc region 12 members out of 40 members of the local organisation left. The same happened in Českolipsko and in the Liberec region, where several representatives stepped down from the candidate list for the elections. In Prostějov, the leader of the list, Hana Naclerová, and with her 11 other members, left out due to the dissatisfaction with the power linkage in Prostějov City.

Institutionalisation of Newcomer Parties in Theory and Practice...

leadership, there is no severe factionalism within ANO. Nor is there an ongoing debate between opinion groups that would support the exchange of opinions and formulation of policies. Yet, from time to time, ANO has to deal with splits of party clubs of representatives on the local level or within local organizations. This led to the dissolution of several local organisations. Some of the dissatisfied former members of ANO formed a new platform called PRO 2016, however this movement was not successful in the past elections. At the very latest from 2015 there have been media mentions of nonconformist or burdensome members being expelled from the party and of party organisations being dissolved to solve intra-party issues.⁶ ANO claims that these members acted against the party moral codex or statutes, or that they harmed the party by their actions. On the other hand, the expelled members claimed, similar to the members who left ANO out of their own will, that the party is organized in authoritarian way, and that their opinions were not tolerated.

Conclusion

An institutionalised party should be able to overcome challenges. The better the party is able to adapt to changes in political affairs, the less it is threatened with de-institutionalisation, which can break up even seemingly successful parties (see Arter, Kestilä-Kakkonen, 2014: 937). The degree of institutionalization influences how a party is able to cope with the pressure arising from public office, how it can solve conflicts and prevent the potential outflow of supporters, and to promote its policies. Political science research has been addressing the question as to why some parties are unified and cohesive, while others collapse shortly after their initial success for some time now. This research has not yielded a generally accepted answer. The institutionalisation process thus stays to a certain extent "*somewhat enigmatic*" (McMenamin, Gwiazda, 2011: 838). There is still a lack of understanding why certain parties are in fact institutionalized and others are not. Still, the phenomenon of institutionalisation is not only an interesting theoretical puzzle, but also a recurring theme in the literature on democratic consolidation and the subject of interest in the practical research of post-communist democratic transitions (Tavits, 2013; CasalBértoa, 2016).

The goal of this paper is to give an insight to the complex process through which political parties gain their value and stability. In this paper, after a critical review of approaches available, an approach based on the work of David Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen 2014, is applied, with 11 indicators being operationalized within 3 levels of party institutionalisation. The fundamental advantage of this approach is that these parties are not expected to achieve a state of "perfect institutionalization" in all dimensions simultaneously, thus allowing for depiction of the asynchronous nature of the institutionalization process.

This framework is then applied to the case of Andrej Babiš's party ANO 2011, a business-firm party established in 2012 that through last couple of years became the most successful "newcomer" in the party system. It is apparent that as to the electoral institutionalisation the institutionalisation of ANO is strengthening when it comes to the electoral gain and the levels of its nationalisation. However, the party still lacks a more

⁶ In this way, the local organisation in the city of Karlovy Vary has been dissolved in 2014, as well as in Liberec and Frýdland in 2016. This year proved to be challenging for the party on the regional level. Members have been expelled from the party in Prague district 4, where two members did not follow the instructions of the Chairman of the local organisation, as well as several members in České Budějovice, who acted against the party's wishes.

discernible electoral core and the identification of the electorate primary lays with the leader of the party. These two criteria correspond with the fact that ANO is labelled as a business-firm party (Charvát, Just, 2016). ANO is very active when it comes to spreading of values, disposing of both affiliated organisations an electoral party press, as well as a possible access to the Babiš-owned media. On the internal level, although having a small to non-existent member base and the authority of the strong, founding leader, who supplies a large portion of the party's income are one of the prominent characteristic of a (not only) business-firm party, ANO's membership base has slowly increased, in a very controlled and purposeful manner (especially around the time of local elections), successfully supplying candidates for elections. Although ANO is far from aspiring to become a mass party, with its approximately 3000 members, there have been proclamations that accepting more members into the party is possible. The party also has both regional and local organisations, with the number of regional organisation increasing rapidly between 2014-2016. The distribution and regulation of power is very uneven, with Babiš and a small core of loyal supporters being in charge and even strengthening the leaders' powers over time. The income has become more disperse over the years, yet it is far more homogenous than for instance the income of "established" parties, with large portion of the income being supplemented by loans and gifts from Babiš's own holding Agrofert. These aspects, as well as the amount of subsidies that come from the state and the EU towards the companies associated in one way or another with members of ANO, can prove dangerous for the long term institutionalisation of the party.

On the level of legislative representatives, it is possible to observe a very strong position of the leader within his party, with high levels of party discipline, especially on the MP level. Although, at the very latest from 2015 we could have seen mentions of nonconformist or burdensome members being expelled from the party and of local organisations being dissolved to solve intra-party issues, the "second man" of ANO, Jaroslav Faltýnek, is very active when dealing with frictions, splitting or squabbles within the party on the ground himself.

From the analysis outlined it becomes clear that the levels of institutionalisation of ANO are either strengthening or being kept at stable level, with potential problems rising from the business-firm model affecting the party's finances and the inter-party relationships, with the strict rule of Babiš on one hand keeping the party together and on the other, posing a risk in the case, that Babiš would have to step down as the party leader. Yet, the party is striving to improve its cohesion find loyal local elites, to build a regional and local organisation and to improve the heterogeneity of the party's income, with very controlled increase of the membership base and the occasional (and not negligible) party frictions and factionalisms being swiftly dealt with by the elite's ruling hand.

The approach of Arter and Kestilä-Kakkonen (2014) can be modified and applied to the research of the institutionalisation of political parties within the post-communistic bloc, even though it was designed to research the case of the populist True Finns party. After applying the modified concept on the case of ANO 2011, it becomes clear that indeed the institutionalization does not indeed to take place at all levels simultaneously, nor that we can a priori assume that successful institutionalization can take place only if the political subject has a mass membership base, nationwide electoral support and large parliamentary group, allowing for a better reflection on the institutionalization process of new political parties in post-communist Central Europe –

Institutionalisation of Newcomer Parties in Theory and Practice...

as the process as a whole is a fluid one, the institutionalization of different aspects of an individual party is similarly so. While parties may be strongly institutionalized in some aspects, as in the case of ANO, successful establishment within the system may be prevented by inadequate adaptability or inability to root in the society. The question remains, if ANO as a party will be able to become a value itself, surpassing the individual goals of its elites and gain stability and durability in the future; these may not even be the goals of the party's leader, who built ANO as his own political project and his "firm". However, there are indicators that the party is, at least on some levels, moving towards institutionalisation, albeit a very fragile one.

Acknowledgement

This paper was written as a part of a research project "Political entrepreneurs, business-firm parties and the issue of their institutionalization in the political system: the Czech Republic in central European comparison" (č. E03-53), financed from the Internal Grant System of the Metropolitan University Prague.

References:

- Anobudelig.cz. (2018). [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://www.anobudelig.cz/cs/>.
- Arter, D. – Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2014). Measuring the Extent of Party Institutionalization: The Case of a Populist Entrepreneur Party. *West European Politics*, (37), 932-956.
- Basedau, M., Stroh, A. (2008). Measuring party institutionalization in developing countries: A new research instrument applied to 28 African political parties. *GIGA working papers* [online], [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/47720>.
- Beníšková, A. (2017). Babiš a Okamura vysálilevici, od TOP 09 se přebíhalo k ODS, mínianalytik. Retrieved from: https://zpravy.idnes.cz/presuny-hlasu-volici-strany-volby-2017-ekologicka-inference-pac-domaci.aspx?c=A171023_153934_domaci_ale
- Bolleyer, N., Bytcek, E. (2013). Origins of party formation and new party success in advanced democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, (52), 773–796.
- Casal Bértoa, F. (2016). Political parties or party systems? Assessing the 'myth' of institutionalisation and democracy. *West European Politics*, (40), 402-429.
- Charvát, J., Just, P., (2016). *Krizepolitickéhostranictví a novístraničtíaktéři v česképolitice*. Praha: Metropolitan University Prague Press.
- Golosov, G. V. (2016). Party system nationalization: The problems of measurement with an application to federal states. *Party politics*, (22), 278-288.
- Gregor, P. (2016). ANO berevoliče ČSSD a komunistům, příznivci pravice se vrací k ODS. [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: https://zpravy.idnes.cz/analyza-ano-ubira-volice-cssd-a-kscm-d65-/domaci.aspx?c=A161102_204050_domaci_san
- Harmel, R., Svåsand, L. (1993). Party Leadership and Party Institutionalization: tree Phases of Development. *West European Politics*, (16), 67-88.
- Harmel, R., Svåsand, L., Mjelde, H. (2016). Party Institutionalization and De-institutionalization: Concepts and Indicators. *ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops* [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/4f8c6fcb-aed7-4f97-83a4-5f039120b9ee.pdf>.
- Huntington, S., (1986). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- IPPS (2018). [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Available online: <https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz>
- Kopecký, J. (2016). Nevěřím Babišovu heslu nelžu a nekradu, říká Zeličková k odchodu z ANO. [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: https://zpravy.idnes.cz/neverim-babisovu-heslu-nelzu-a-nekradu-rika-zelienkova-k-odchodu-z-ano-1eq-/domaci.aspx?c=A160724_153925_domaci_kop
- Kopeček, L., Svačinová, P. (2015). Kdorozhoduje v českých politických stranách? Vzestup nových politických podnikatelů vesrovnávací perspektivě. *Středoevropské politické studie*, (17), 178-211.
- Levitsky, S. (1998). Institutionalization and Peronism: the Concept, the Case and the Case for Unpacking the Concept. *Party Politics*, (4), 77-92.
- Maleshevich, A. A., (2007). *Party systems in post-soviet countries: A comparative study of political institutionalization in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Markowski, R. (2001). Party System Institutionalization in New Democracies: Poland – A Trend-setter with no Followers. In Paul, L. (editor), *Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-communist Europe: The First Decade*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 55-77.
- Mcmenamin, I. & GWIAZDA, A. (2011). Three roads to institutionalisation: Vote-, office- and policy-seeking explanations of party switching in Poland. *European Journal of Political Research*, (50), 838-866.
- Panebianco, A., (1998). *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Politicefinance.cz (2018). [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: <http://www.politicefinance.cz>.
- PsP 2018. [online]. [cit. 31-10-2018]. Retrieved from: <https://www.psp.cz/sqw/snem.sqw?l=cz&id=1292>
- Randal, V. (2006). Party Institutionalization and its Implications for Democracy. *Political Parties and Democratization at the IPSA Congress* [online]. [cit. 2017-11-16]. Retrieved from: http://archives.cap.anu.edu.au/cdi_anu_edu_au/cdinews/featured_articles/featured-articles_downloads/2006_08_CDI.News_AUG_SEP_FA_2_Randall.pdf
- Randall, V., Svåsand, L. (2002). Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. *Party Politics*, (8), 5-29.
- Sandbrook, R. (1996) Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African cases. *Third World Quarterly*, (17), 69–87.
- Šoulková, K. (2017). Zásadní práva voleb? Voliči strany práce hromadně zbehli k miliardáři Babišovi. Retrieved from: <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/specialy/volby-2017/2281645-zasadni-zprava-voleb-volici-strany-prace-hromadne-zbehli-k-miliardari>
- Strauber, J. (2015). Organizační vývoj nových politických stran v České republice pohledem teorie institucionalizace. *Acta Politologica*, (7), 133-155.
- Tavits, M., (2013). *Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Válková, H. (2013). ODS ztratila třitisíc členů, Babiš láká víc než Peake. Retrieved from: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ods-ztratila-tri-tisice-clenu-babis-laka-vice-nez-peake-ppw-/domaci.aspx?c=A130506_153744_domaci_hv>.
- Volby.cz (2017). Available online <https://volby.cz>.

Article Info

Received: September 24 2018

Accepted: October 12 2018
